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In the Sttpreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
ALTON H. DAVIS, by and through 
his Guardian, George A. Davis, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
PROVO CITY CORPORATION, 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY, a 
corporation, and ROBERT S. CLARK, 
Respondents. 
CASE 
NO. 7905 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT PROVO CITY 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case is before the Supreme Court to test whether 
or not appellant's complaint states a cause of action upon 
which relief can be had. The facts set forth in appellant's 
brief, insofar as they are consistent with those contained 
in the cornplaint, should be admitted by defendant Provo 
City for all purposes incidental to a determination of that 
question. It may be noted, however, that defendant Provo 
City would controvert substantially all ·of the alleged facts 
upon a trial on the 1nerits. 
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2 
POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT 1 
APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE 
A CAUSE OF ACTION BASED ON NEGLIGENCE 
AGAINST RESPONDENT PROVO CITY. 
POINT 2 
APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE 
A CAUSE OF ACTION BASED UPON THE DOCTRINE 
OF ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE AGAINST RESPONDENT 
PRO\T!O CITY. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
The Utah Statutes. provide that every claim against 
a city for damages or injury from negligence of the city in 
respect to any street, alley, etc., shall within thirty days 
after the happening of such injury or damage be presented 
to the Board of Commissioners. Utah Code Annotated, 
1943, Title 15-7-76. 
Appellant's complaint alleges that the injury occurred 
on December 7, 1951, an~ that the claim for damages was 
filed with the city on the 8th day of January, 1952. Obvi-
ously, therefore, it appears on the face of the complaint that 
the claim was not presented within the time required by 
law. Failure to present such claim to the governing body 
of the city within the time specified in Title 15-7-76 shall 
be a sufficient bar. Utah Code Annota~, 1943, Title 15-
7-77. Presentation of claim within time fixed by law is a 
condition precedent to bringing action against a town. Hur-
ley v. Town of Bingham, 63 Utah 589, 228 P. 213; Nelson 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
v. Logan City (Utah), 135 P. (2) 259; Peterson v. Salt Lake 
City (Utah), 221 P. (2) 591; White v. Heber City (Utah), 
26 P. (2) 333; Sehy v. Salt Lake City, 41 Utah 535, 126 
P. 691. 
It is impossible to escape the conclusion, from the facts 
alleged in appellant's complaint, that negligence chargeable 
to the city, if any, arose in respect of a street. However, 
appellant does not argue that aspect of the case, but seems 
to rest only upon the question of general negligence on the 
part of the city relating to a coasting area, not in respect 
of a street. 
Parks, playgrounds, coasting areas, etc., provided by 
a city for the general enjoyment of its citizens, ,constitute 
a public or governmental function, as distinguished from a 
proprietary undertaking. In connection with such govern-
mental function a municipality may not be held liable for 
negligence of its servants or agents. Alder v. Salt Lake 
City, 64 Utah 568, 231 P. 1102; Principle reaffirmed in 
Husband v. Salt Lake City (Utah), 69' P. (2) 491, 494. 
Niblock v. Salt Lake City, 100 Utah 573, 111 P. (2) 800. 
See also, Abbott v. City of Des Moines, 298 N. \V. 649. The 
action of the municipality in designating a street or area 
for coasting was solely for the common enjoyment of the 
inhabitan-ts of the city, and was entirely without the ele-
ment of special corporate benefit or pecuniary profit. There 
is no allegation that any charge or fee was imposed or in-
tended. ~lcQuillin-Municipal Corporation, 3rd Edition, 
Vol. 18, Pages 194, 195, 196, states: 
"The doctrine exempting a Municipal Corporation 
from private action for torts resulting from the per-
formance of its governmental functions, steadily ad-
hered to by the most recent judicial decisions . . . . 
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is based on the familiar reason that the undertaking 
is not to promote the private interests of the munici-
pality as a corporate entity, but rather for the public 
benefit, and in the performance of such obligation the 
municipality is a mere public agent, either of the state 
or of the local community." 
See also the list of authorities therein collected, includ-
ing Burton v. Salt Lake City, 69 Utah 186, 253 P. 443. The 
cases cited by the appellant do not reflect the law as shown 
by the more recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Utah, 
nor by the weight of authority from other jurisdictions. 
Moreover, even conceding that there was negligence 
chargeable to defendant Provo City, plaintiff's complaint 
is still fatally defective, for the complaint shows that neg-
~igence, if any, on the part of said defendant was not a 
proximate cause of the injury complained of. An entirely 
different party or person, not connected in any way with 
either Provo City or defendant Brigham Young University, 
is shown to have been the moving factor without which the 
accident in question would not have taken place. See Davis 
v. Mellen, 55 Utah 9, 189 P. 920. 
POINT 2 
Appellant's complaint fails to state a cause of action 
against Provo City based on the Doctrine of attractive nui-
sance. 
The difference between attractive nuisance and negli-
gence is that in attractive nuisance the wrongfulness is in 
doing the act at all, ,while negligence arises from the mere 
failure to exercise ordinary or reasonable care in the per-
formance of the act. See llusband v. Salt Lake city, supra. 
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5 
It has been said that nuisance arises from an absolute duty 
not to do, while negligence involves requisite care in the 
doing. 
Appellant does not allege or contend that Provo City 
had an absolute duty to refrain from designating the coast-
ing area in question. The claim is based upon the alleged 
fact that the city did "willfully and negligently fail to take 
any steps to guard or protect the children against injury." 
Appellant's Complaint. There is no allegation that the city, 
aside from indicating that the hill could be used for coast-
ing, did anything except place a "saw horse" at the bottom 
of the hill. There is no claim that the "saw horse" was of 
itself a dangerous instrumentality, or that the child was in-
jured while playing with the "saw horse." 
By merely designating an existing street or roadway 
as a coasting area, has the city created an attractive nui-
sance? We think not. While we have been unable to find 
a Utah case directly deciding the question, the Supreme 
Court of Washington, in Gerritson v. City of Seat~, 2 P. 
(2) 1092, held as a matter of law, that the closing of a street 
as a playground for children was not a nuisance. 
Moreover, in seeking to charge the city with liability 
for injury due to attractive nuisance, notice thereof, either 
actual or constructive, is required. McQuillan, Municipal 
Corporations, 3rd Edition, Volume 18, Page 275 and cases 
there collected. From appellant's complaint it appears that 
the injury complained of was sustained on about the same 
day that the coasting area was allegedly designated by the 
city. The complaint does not even allege that the city had ac-
tual or constructive notice of any hidden danger or that the 
coasting area itself could prove a dangerous instrumentality. 
We think appellant's claim must fail for this reason also. 
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6. 
CONCLUSION 
It' is manifest that the appellant's complaint does not 
state a cause of action against respondent Provo City upon 
which any relief could be obtained and that the decision of 
the lower court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLAIR M. ALDRICH, 
Attorney for Respondent 
Provo City 
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